Capacity Assessment and Information Provision for Voluntary Psychiatric Patients: a service evaluation in a UK NHS Trust by Perry, Benjamin Ian et al.
[2016] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
107 
 
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND INFORMATION PROVISION FOR VOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC 
PATIENTS: A SERVICE EVALUATION IN A UK NHS TRUST 
 
BENJAMIN IAN PERRY*, SWARAN PREET SINGH**, DAVID HEDLEY WHITE*** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
Since the Cheshire West judgement, yearly applications for the Mental Health Act 
(MHA) and Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) have increased, though many 
patients are still admitted informally. To ensure lawfulness, informal admissions must 
be capacitous, informed, and without coercion. If fully capacitous consent is not 
obtained, then there is a risk of “de facto” detention and deprivation of liberty.  
Deprivation of liberty is only lawful through appropriate legal frameworks (DoLS for 
incapacitous, non-objecting hospital inpatients, or MHA otherwise).  Use of such legal 
frameworks might be hampered by the perceived stigma associated with them, though 
this may not be in the best interests of the patient. 
 
B. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
We aimed to examine the assessment of capacity and provision of adequate 
information required for an informed voluntary psychiatric admission, and any 
evidence of possible coercion into informal admission. We postulate variable use of 
legal frameworks designed to empower patients and prevent illegal deprivation of 
liberty. 
 
C. METHODS 
 
A retrospective randomized sample (n=50) was obtained from psychiatric admissions 
between May 1st and August 31st 2015 to Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership NHS 
Trust. Clinical notes were evaluated for demographics, assessment of capacity and 
the provision of adequate information surrounding admission, and for the presence of 
documentation pertaining to a ‘de facto detention’ during the first week of admission. 
 
D. RESULTS 
 
Seventeen patients (34%) were detained on admission. At one week, nine further 
patients were detained. Eight of these patients were detained within 72 hours of 
voluntary admission. Capacity assessment was documented in 54% of these patients. 
The provision of adequate information was poor, at just 26%. None of the nine patients 
later detained within the first week were provided the required information on 
admission. Documentation pertaining to a ‘de facto detention’ was present in 21% of 
voluntary patients’ notes at admission, and 24% at 24 hours. After 24 hours, the 
prevalence and frequency decreased over the first week. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
 
Both capacity assessment and provision of adequate information to allow an informed 
decision for voluntary admission were poorly documented. As none of the patients 
detained during the first week of admission were provided adequate information 
pertaining to the admission, it is not possible to discount the possibility of coercion into 
admission in this subgroup. The presence of documentation pertaining to ‘de facto 
detention’ was common, and may point toward a potential illegal deprivation of liberty. 
Our findings suggest that more needs to be done to ensure vulnerable individuals are 
not subject to illegal deprivation of liberty whilst under psychiatric care. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Those with severe mental illness may be vulnerable, and are at risk of coercive 
hospital admission (Hoge et al, 1997). Once they remain as an inpatient, they are also 
at risk of deprivation of liberty (Poulson, 2002). To help prevent potential exploitation, 
legal frameworks are in place to empower and protect those patients most vulnerable 
due to their mental disorder, potentially due to impaired capacity or insight. The 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 5 
states that all human beings have the right to liberty and security of person (Art 5(1), 
Council of Europe, 1950), save in certain circumstances, which include a mental 
disorder (Art 5(1)(e), Council of Europe, 1950) meeting the Winterwerp criteria. These 
criteria include ‘reliable demonstration of unsound mind by an objective medical 
professional; of a nature or degree warranting hospital inpatient stay; and persistent 
(Winterwerp v Netherlands, 1979). 
 
When a mentally disordered person is deprived of their liberty, it must be in accordance 
with a process set down in law, and the person must have speedy access to a Court 
(Art 5(4), Council of Europe, 1950).  Currently, in England and Wales, there are three 
ways in which a mentally disordered patient can be lawfully detained in hospital should 
this be deemed necessary; via the Mental Health Act (MHA) (1983, as amended 
2007), via the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (Mental Capacity Act 2005 as 
amended 2007, Schedule A1) (DoLS) or by order of the Court of Protection (CoP), as 
outlined in table 1. Each of these is a due legal process, with the necessary patient-
orientated safeguards such as the right to appeal or second opinion. 
Mental Health Act (1983) (MHA) Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards (2009) (DoLS) 
Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
High Court (Court of 
Protection (CoP)) 
Section 2 (assessment order) 
lasts up to 28 days 
 
Sections 3&37 (treatment order) 
last up to 6 months, but second 
opinion required to administer 
treatment after 3 months 
 
Allow detention of incapacitous, 
compliant patients in hospitals 
or care homes 
 
 
Introduced following 
“Bournewood judgment” 
 
Reserved for complicated 
cases where MHA or DoLS 
cannot be used 
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The nature of what constitutes ‘deprivation of liberty’ has been repeatedly re-examined 
over the last few decades, leading to the three means of lawful detention as described 
above. This began with the ‘Bournewood’ Case (R. v Bournewood Community and 
Mental Health NHS Trust, 1997, EWHC Admin 850), in which a man (HL) with severe 
learning difficulties was an “informal” psychiatric inpatient.  He was compliant with care 
and treatment, and for this reason, the hospital decided not to apply the MHA, which 
was the only legal means for detention available to them at that time. His carers argued 
that he was “unlawfully detained” because he was not allowed to leave the ward or to 
have his carers visit him, and sought a judicial review of the hospital’s decision.   
 
The High Court decided that HL was not unlawfully detained, because he had not 
attempted to leave and had therefore not been forcibly restrained.  At the Court of 
Appeal, it was decided that the patient had been unlawfully detained, and should have 
been detained under the MHA (R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS 
Trust, 1997, EWCA Civ 2879).  
 
On further appeal in the House of Lords (R. v Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust, 1998, UKHL 24) the decision was overturned again. The House of 
Lords said that for there to be unlawful detention there must be actual rather than 
potential restraint.  They were also worried that if the Court of Appeal decision were to 
stand, tens of thousands of informal patients would be detained under the MHA, with 
considerable financial costs and excessive stigmatization.  
 
Emergency holding powers 
(Section 5) for patients already in 
hospital, last up to 72 hours 
 
For application, ‘MHA 
assessment’ carried out involving 
psychiatrist uninvolved with the 
case, a doctor who knows the 
patient and approved mental 
health practitionera 
 
Includes right to appeal and a 
second opinion 
 
Those on treatment sections 
subject to section 117 aftercareb 
Include the right to appeal by 
patient or ‘relevant 
representative’ to Court of 
Protection 
 
To be detained in hospital the 
patient must be fully compliant 
with all aspects of care (if not 
the MHA must be used instead). 
Table 1: legal deprivation of liberty in England and Wales at a glance 
 
a Approved mental health practitioner might be from a range of backgrounds, for example general practitioner or social worker. 
b The duty of Health and Social Services to provide funding for continued patient care. 
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However, this case was then brought to the European Court of Human Rights (HL v 
UK 45508/99, 2004, ECHR 471), which made the final judgment that the distinction 
between ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ restraint was irrelevant, and that HL had been deprived 
of his liberty. Furthermore he had been kept in hospital under the common law 
“doctrine of necessity”, which the Court said was not a “procedure set down in law” 
required under Article 5.  DoLS arose out of this judgment; the Mental Capacity Act 
(2005) was amended to include DoLS. (Mental Capacity Act 2005 as amended 2007, 
Schedule A1).  DoLS created a legal process for the detention of passively compliant, 
incapacitous patients, and introduced various safeguards for such patients. 
 
More recently, important judgments have occurred in high profile court cases such as 
‘P v Cheshire West’ and ‘P & Q v Surrey County Council’, involving vulnerable 
individuals residing outside of hospital. The Supreme Court (P v Cheshire West 2014), 
in its ruling on the above cases, defined what constitutes a deprivation of liberty, in 
what it called the “acid test”.  If a person is under “constant supervision and control” 
and he or she is “not free to leave at any time”, then the person is, by definition, 
deprived of their liberty.  Baroness Hale, in the leading judgment, said ‘a gilded cage 
is still a cage’, meaning that even if all agree that a patient’s care and treatment is in 
their best interests, the patient is still being deprived of his liberty. 
 
These cases have major implications for those working in a mental health setting.  For 
example, applications under the MHA have risen year on year, perhaps in part due to 
concerns over potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty (Care Quality Commission, 
2014).  Even more concerning is that since the “Cheshire West” ruling by the Supreme 
Court, DoLS applications in England increased tenfold, from 13,700 in 2013-14 to 
137,540 in 2014-15 (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, many patients are still admitted informally (i.e. not admitted under a legal 
framework). Severity of mental illness aside, there may be other reasons for this. 
Firstly and perhaps most significantly, a capacitous patient may be strictly consenting 
to have their liberty deprived, though this may be hard to envisage. Secondly, MHA 
assessments carry a financial burden. Thirdly, detention under the MHA carries 
stigma. Though there have been improvements (Thornicroft et al, 2013), mental illness 
is adversely portrayed in the media (Weinrich, 2014), and public perception of those 
with mental illness remains negative (Schomerus, 2012). Even when discharged from 
the MHA, patients may be met with foreign travel restrictions, insurance premium 
increases, and increased difficulty in obtaining employment (Stuart, 2006).   
 
This is despite the Mental Health (Discrimination) Act (2013), which aimed to combat 
the stigma attached to having been detained under the MHA.  It removed the blanket 
ban on such individuals participating in jury service, amended rules that might remove 
individuals as directors of public or private companies ‘by reason of mental health’, 
and removed legislation under which a Member of Parliament would automatically lose 
their seat if they are detained under the MHA for greater than six months. These are 
all positive steps in the reduction of the potential societal disadvantage that might be 
experienced by patients with mental illness.  
 
The MHA has numerous safeguards to protect patients.  In addition to the right to 
appeal, to a second opinion about treatment, and to advocacy, it notably includes an 
important role for the Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP).  The AMHP is an 
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independent mental health professional, but not a doctor, with special training and 
expertise in mental health and law.  The role of AMHPs is “to provide an independent 
decision about whether or not there are alternatives to detention under the Act, 
bringing a social perspective to bear on their decision, and taking account of the ‘least 
restrictive option and maximising independence’ guiding principle” (MHA Code of 
Practice, Department of Health, 2015).  The AMHP makes the final decision about 
detaining a patient under the Act (“making an application”) albeit supported by two 
medical “recommendations”. 
 
Despite advances in combatting stigma, and despite the safeguards built into the MHA 
to protect patients, some suggest that detention under the MHA should be used only 
when a patient in a psychiatric hospital is actively trying to leave. A guiding principle 
of the MHA is the “least restrictive” principle – “where it is possible to treat a patient 
safely and lawfully without detaining them under the Act, the patient should not be 
detained” (MHA Code of Practice, Department of Health 2015). Some argue that 
keeping a patient informal is the ‘least restrictive’ option, an option that carries the 
least possible harm.  Some go further and argue that mental health professionals, with 
their ability to detain individuals, are ‘suborned as agents of social control’ (Mullen, 
2005). 
 
As mentioned, an informal (voluntary) patient should make a fully informed decision to 
be admitted.  Without this there is a risk of coercion into admission and a subsequent 
unlawful deprivation of liberty. 
 
In 2014, the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
(R.C.Psych.) published a response following ‘P 
v Cheshire West’ and ‘P & Q v Surrey County 
Council’, outlining a list of nine pieces of 
information a patient should have in order to 
consent to admission, some of which are 
outlined in figure 1.   
 
The response also reiterates the concept of ‘de 
facto detention’. That is, the patient remains 
‘voluntary’ in the full knowledge that they would 
be detained if they attempted to leave. Such an 
admission runs a serious risk of representing an 
unlawful deprivation of liberty, removes access 
to the safeguards of the MHA (for example 
appeal to a tribunal), and could be construed as 
paternalistic. 
 
Other authors have examined extra-legal deprivation of liberty in other legal 
jurisdictions; in Denmark (Poulson, 2002) and the USA (Hoge et al, 1997).  We could 
find no similar recent work in England and Wales.  
 
In light of Cheshire West and the changing definition of ‘deprivation of liberty’, we 
wished to examine voluntary admissions for the risk of ‘de facto detention’. We 
suspected that some ‘voluntary’ patients may not be giving fully informed consent to 
Fig. 1 Examples of information to be provided 
to patients as outlined in R.C.Psych. document 
That the person will be expected to remain on 
the ward, most likely for at least 24 hours 
 
The possibility of having some personal items 
confiscated, and personal searches 
 
That the nursing staff must be informed of plans 
when the person requests to leave the ward 
 
That the nursing staff may refuse to agree to 
allow the person to leave the ward. 
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admission, and that mental health professionals may still be reluctant to use the MHA, 
despite the safeguards it offers for both patients and professionals. 
 
II. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of the study was to examine the possibility of coercion into ‘voluntary’ 
admission in psychiatric patients. 
 
The objectives were firstly to ascertain whether capacity to consent for admission was 
adequately assessed, and whether those patients admitted as voluntary were provided 
with sufficient information to be able to make an informed decision to come into 
hospital. 
 
Secondly, the study examined the demographics and prevalence of psychiatric 
diagnoses of admitted patients, and the prevalence of use of the MHA for newly 
admitted patients during the first week of admission. We hypothesize that a ‘quick 
switch’ from informal to formal admission soon after admission may reflect an initial 
coercion into informal admission. 
 
Thirdly, we assessed whether informal patients may have been subject to a ‘de facto 
detention’ during the first week of admission. 
 
III. METHODS 
 
A. Study location & trust policy 
 
The study was completed at Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership NHS Trust, 
United Kingdom, during the four-month period between May 1st – August 31st 2015. 
Adult inpatient mental health services in the trust comprise of three acute psychiatric 
units, The Caludon Centre in Coventry (112 beds), St. Michaels Hospital in Warwick 
(41 beds), and The Pembleton Unit in Nuneaton (12 beds) with adult rehabilitation 
services provided at multiple sites (40 beds), for a catchment area of around 850,000 
people. As with most mental health trusts in the UK currently, the trust is close to or 
meeting inpatient capacity at all times. 
 
The MHA Code of Practice (Department of Health, 2015) states that when a patient 
needs to be in hospital, informal admission is usually appropriate when a patient who 
has the capacity to give or to refuse consent, is consenting to admission. However, 
there is no trust guideline currently outlining whether this should be assessed by 
nursing staff, or by the admitting doctor. There is no national or Trust guideline outside 
of the aforementioned publication by the Royal College of Psychiatrists on ensuring 
patients admitted informally are given adequate information on what an admission will 
be like, including the “rules” of the institution. 
 
B. Eligibility Criteria 
 
All patients admitted to adult inpatient mental health services, both acute and 
rehabilitation, in the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Trust between May 1st 
2015 – August 31st 2015 featured as the sampling frame. There were no specific 
inclusion criteria for diagnosis or length of admission to help prevent selection bias. 
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C. Ethics 
 
The study was approved by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Trust as a service 
evaluation and as such did not need formal ethical approval from an NHS Research 
Ethics Committee.  Data was collated in an anonymized format from routine clinical 
records, by the lead author. 
 
D. Method 
 
A sample size of 50 was achieved via the randomization function of Microsoft Excel 
from a spreadsheet containing details of all patients that met eligibility criteria outlined 
above. The sample size was chosen based upon guidance from the National Audit 
Office (National Audit Office, 2001).  Clinical notes were analysed by the authors, 
firstly, for the diagnosis (either provisional or established) alongside demographic 
information including age, sex and length of admission. Documentation pertaining to 
the admission was analysed for evidence that a) capacity to consent to admission was 
assessed at the time of admission, and b) information surrounding the reality and rules 
of an admission were appropriately explained to the patient. 
 
Next, the clinical notes were assessed (either from consultant ward round notes, 
nursing observations or clinical assessment by doctor) at specified frequencies (0hrs, 
24hrs, 48hrs, 72hrs, 1 week) from admission for legal status, any change in such, and 
any evidence of a ‘de facto detention’ as documented in the clinical notes of informal  
patients. This was assessed by the presence of documentation such as ‘if the patient 
tries to leave the ward, for section 5(2)’. Descriptive statistics were used to illustrate 
findings. 
 
E. Results 
 
i. Demographics 
The sample included a roughly even split amongst sexes (24m, 26f). Mean age was 
46.28 (statistical range 64). 
 
ii. Diagnosis on admission 
Figure 2 outlines the spread of diagnoses 
(established or main differential) amongst 
study subjects. The majority (46%) of admitted 
patients included in the study were diagnosed 
with psychotic illness. This broadly mirrors 
other published literature on psychiatric 
admission statistics (Thompson et al, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnosis n 
Schizophrenia and related diagnosis 23 
Depression/Suicidal Ideation 11 
Bipolar Affective Disorder 9 
Personality Disorder 3 
Substance Misuse 2 
Anorexia 1 
Organic Illness 1 
Fig 2. Diagnosis on admission 
amongst study participants 
[2016] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
114 
 
iii. Length of Admission 
Length of admission is outlined in figure 3. The majority 
of patients in the sample were discharged from hospital 
within six weeks. 
 
iv. Legal Status and discharges 
Seventeen patients (34%) were detained on 
admission. At seventy-two hours, a further eight 
patients had been detained. Three patients were 
discharged home during the first seven days. At seven 
days, one further patient had been detained (56% total 
of remaining admitted patients). No patients were 
discharged from the MHA during the first seven days. 
DoLS were not used in our sample. 
 
v. Capacity assessment and information provided on admission 
A formal capacity assessment was documented in twenty-seven patients (54%), 
though this was higher in patients detained on admission (82% of detained patients). 
Only thirteen (39%) of informal patients had a capacity assessment documented. 
 
Information pertaining to the reality and rules of an inpatient admission was provided 
to thirteen patients (26%). Again, this was more common for detained patients (59%) 
than patients admitted informally (10%). 
 
None of the nine patients detained during the first week of admission had documented 
evidence that information relating to the reality and rules of a mental health inpatient 
admission had been explained. 
 
vi. ‘De facto detention’ 
As visible in table 2, the presence of 
documentation pertaining to ‘de facto 
detention’ was prevalent during the 
first week of admission. Prevalence 
was highest either at or soon after 
admission, and gradually declined in 
frequency and prevalence over the 
first week. 
 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, admissions into acute mental health beds were assessed for the 
possibility of coercion into voluntary admission. We present several findings of note. 
Firstly, capacity assessment and the provision of information pertaining to the reality 
of a mental health inpatient stay were poorly recorded, especially amongst patients 
admitted informally. Capacity assessment and the provision of information were better, 
though still lacking, in patients admitted under the MHA. This may be an issue of poor 
documentation, rather than an absence of seeking and gaining valid informed consent.  
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that some admissions were subject to 
Time 0hr 24hr 48hr 72hr 1wk 
N 7 7 5 4 2 
total 
voluntary 33 29 26 23 21 
% 21 24 19 17 10 
0
5
10
15
20
n
Length (weeks)
Admission Length
Fig 3. Length of admission 
amongst study subjects 
Table 2: ‘De Facto detention’ 
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coercion into informal admission. These results echo those from previous pre-
Cheshire West work (Poulson et al, 2002; Hoge et al, 1997), suggesting that coercion 
into admission and extra-legal deprivation of liberty are still commonplace in the 
mental health population. It is possible that this is a reflection of an inherent wish of 
professionals to avoid endowing patients with the potential weight of stigma that might 
still be attached to the use of the MHA, as previously mentioned. 
 
It may be true that had a larger number of voluntary patients had the reality of inpatient 
admission explained to them, some might have refused admission. In this case, the 
difficult but nonetheless vital decision of ‘what to do next’ (i.e. could the patient be 
managed in the community with maximal community support available) could have 
been addressed. It seems plausible that better performance on information-giving in 
the “sectioned on admission” group stems from the formal, legal nature of such an 
admission. 
 
None of the patients detained during the first week of admission had information on 
the ‘reality of inpatient admission’ explained to them when they were admitted. It 
seems plausible that their detentions under the MHA occurring at such a short 
frequency from admission reflects an initial coercion into admission, which was then 
challenged by the patient. 
 
Finally, there was a reasonably high prevalence of ‘de facto detention’ in our sample. 
This contradicts guidance provided by the Royal College of Psychiatry. Interestingly, 
the highest prevalence of ‘de facto detention’ appeared either at admission or soon 
after admission, which provides further evidence that a subset of patients may have 
been inappropriately admitted as voluntary patients, when perhaps the severity of their 
mental state may have impaired their capacity or judgment making ability. A quick 
comparison of the rates of conversion from voluntary to legally detained reveals that 
more voluntary patients were subject to a ‘de facto detention’ than were converted to 
formal detention under the MHA at all measured time points, suggesting that a 
proportion of patients subject to a ‘de facto detention’ remained informal. This raises 
the possibility that this subset of patients may therefore have been subject to an extra-
legal deprivation of liberty. 
 
V. LIMITATIONS 
 
There are several important considerations to make when viewing these results. 
Firstly, the sample size is relatively small which may limit generalizability, and increase 
the risk of type II error. A further study conducted on a larger sample size would help 
to improve the power of the study and therefore strengthen any conclusions drawn 
from it. 
 
Secondly, we have used a switch from informal to formal admission within the first 
week as a surrogate marker for the possibility of an initial coercion into admission, 
though this may not be the case. It is wholly possible that a patient with the necessary 
information about their admission may capacitously agree to come in voluntarily and 
then change their mind, or even become more unwell necessitating use of legal 
frameworks. However, it is noticeable that in our sample, all of the informal patients 
later detained within the first week had documented evidence that information about 
the admission had been provided to them. 
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Thirdly, our work does not feature anyone admitted under DoLS. Future work may 
consider stratified sampling to ensure a representative sample of patients detained 
under DoLS. 
 
Fourthly, the retrospective nature of the study relies purely on documentation quality 
in the generation of results. The findings are therefore wholly reliant on detailed, 
accurate documentation, and it is therefore possible that our results do not accurately 
reflect actual practice. Thus, a prospective study might be a more effective means in 
accurately assessing suitability for formal detention under a legal framework. 
 
Fifthly, it is possible that patients bearing longer psychiatric histories, with multiple 
previous admissions, may be given less information on admission than a patient 
suffering their first psychiatric episode. The presence of previous admissions was not 
assessed in the study, and may be pertinent for future work. However, some might 
argue that even in such cases, assumptions should not be made and patients should 
still be offered the relevant information. 
 
Finally, we are unable to prove whether any discrepancy in use of the MHA for newly 
admitted patients is a result of differing beliefs around best practice, or around the 
stigma associated with formal detention under a legal framework. Our findings might 
therefore pave the way for further qualitative work, which may try to capture any 
inherent cultural beliefs that may exist within the healthcare system. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
It is vital that all patients admitted to inpatient mental health services as voluntary 
patients make a free decision to be admitted, and are deemed capacitous to make the 
decision. They must be provided with enough information for the decision to be 
considered informed. Without this there is a risk of coercion and extra-legal deprivation 
of liberty. 
 
Furthermore, the provision of information and assessment of capacity must be 
adequately documented, so that professionals and organizations can defend 
themselves against allegations of unlawful deprivation. Our findings suggest that 
currently, these standards are not being adhered to. 
 
With these findings considered, a guideline, pro forma or flow-chart to guide staff into 
adhering to best practice and the documentation of such might help. Based upon these 
findings, the specified trust has now incorporated a pro forma into policy, to be 
completed by the admitting clinician, ensuring that the patient has capacity to consent 
to admission and has been provided with adequate information on the likely reality of 
an inpatient stay. 
 
The stigma faced by patients with mental illness is real, and may well be amplified by 
a history of detention under the MHA. This may weigh heavy on the minds of those 
professionals tasked with decisions surrounding legal frameworks in the admission of 
acutely unwell psychiatric patients. Whilst our findings highlight the possibility of 
coercion and extralegal deprivation of liberty in voluntary patients, it is likely that the 
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professionals involved believed they were acting in the patient’s best interests. Yet, 
there is evidence that stigma around mental health issues is dissipating, albeit slowly, 
and as such, misgivings about using the MHA may be misplaced.  Equally importantly, 
the law is evolving with respect to deprivation of liberty issues and this cannot be 
ignored. The MHA exists to protect patients and has safeguards to empower them.  
Without these safeguards in place, patients are disempowered, unprotected and 
arguably more stigmatized.  We argue that more education about capacity law and the 
MHA is required for all mental health professionals, in order to improve practice and 
ultimately lessen stigma. 
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